How to Deal with the Economy Today – and How Not To
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University, 2001 Nobel
Prize Winner in Economics
"Seldom have so few gotten so much
from so many." That might be the motto of President Bush's proposed tax
cuts.
As the nation entered the new millennium, it faced three problems.
First, the economy was slowly going into a recession, with a stock market
bubble about to burst. Second, inequality was growing. While the Nineties had
at last arrested the decline in income of those at the bottom of the income
distribution, the fruits of that decade's growth went disproportionately to the
rich. Third, there were long-range problems, including Medicare and Social
Security systems, that were underfunded and an economy that had become addicted
to living beyond its means, borrowing more than a billion dollars a day from
abroad.
Clinton bequeathed to Bush large budget surpluses which might have
been used to shore up our Social Security and Medicare system, provide badly
needed new benefits like long-term care and prescription drugs, and repair
America's aging highways, bridges, and airports. Instead, he took advantage of
the economic downturn to push for a tax cut, but not one designed to stimulate
the economy --and it did not do so to any appreciable degree. Two years later,
the economy is still languishing. The cost of Bush's mistake has been enormous.
In 2001 alone, we had a gap of some 3 percent between the economy's potential
and what it actually produced, which translates into a loss of $300 billion.
And because of this mismanagement of national economic policy, it will be lower
five, ten, twenty years from now since some of the lost output would have been
spent on investments that would have enhanced productivity.
We now know that the tax cuts were ineffective in stimulating the
economy. The tax cuts were oversold as a stimulus; and now we know they failed.
In an astonishing feat of fiscal mismanagement, the Bush administration managed
to squander the surplus, converting it into a $2 trillion deficit.
We know how to create a powerful and effective tax stimulus. What
is needed is to give money through the tax system to those who will spend it
and spend it quickly: the unemployed, the cities and states that are starving
for funds, and lower-income workers. A strong stimulus would also be an
equitable stimulus: the money, by and large, goes to the poorest Americans,
those who have benefited least from the growth of the last quarter century. Giving
money to cities and states would prevent cutbacks in educational and health
expenditures which can hit the poor particularly hard.
Basic economic
analysis indicates that increased government expenditures can indeed be
stimulative, and, in fact, are often more effective as stimulus measures than
tax cuts. The Administration's position largely ignores the
central feature of a recession: lack of demand. In a recession, the primary
problem is that the nation's firms face a reduction in demand for
their products — not that they lack available workers, equipment, or anything
else needed to produce goods and services. Indiscriminately injecting
cash into such firms through tax breaks, without linking the tax breaks to new
business activity, would do little if anything to address the underlying
difficulty. Only when a company faces
renewed demand for its products will it end the process of shedding workers and
begin to create new jobs. As a result, the primary objective of a stimulus
package should be to spur spending on these products.
States are suffering
substantial fiscal stress as a result of the recent economic slowdown. In all
states except Vermont, some form of balanced budget rule forces such
counter-productive fiscal policies: When the state enters a recession, revenue
naturally falls and expenditures rise. The balanced budget rules then force the
state to reduce spending, raise taxes, or some combination thereof, which is
counter-productive since it exacerbates the economic slowdown.
Economic analysis
suggests, contrary to the statements of some political figures, that tax
increases would not in general be more harmful to the economy than spending
reductions. Indeed, in the short run (which is the period of concern during a
downturn), the adverse impact of a tax increase on the economy may, if
anything, be smaller than the adverse impact of a spending reduction, because
some of the tax increase would result in reduced saving rather than reduced
consumption. For example, if taxes increase by $1, consumption may fall by 90
cents and saving may fall by 10 cents. Since a tax increase does not reduce
consumption on a dollar-for-dollar basis, its negative impact on the economy is attenuated in the short run.
Some types of spending reductions, however, would reduce demand in the economy
on a dollar-for-dollar basis and therefore would be more harmful to the economy
than a tax increase.
The impact on the economy depends primarily on the propensity to
consume, that is, on how much of an additional dollar of income is spent rather
than saved, among those who receive the transfer payments or pay the taxes. The
more that the tax increases or transfer reductions are focused on those with
lower propensities to consume (that is, on those who spend less and save more
of each additional dollar of income), the less damage is done to the
weakened economy. The least damaging
approach in the short run involves tax increases concentrated on higher-income
families. Reductions in transfer payments to lower-income families would
generally be more harmful to the economy than increases in taxes on
higher-income families, since lower-income families are more likely to spend
any additional income than higher-income families. Indeed, since the recipients
of transfer payments typically spend virtually their entire income, the
negative impact of reductions in transfer payments is likely to be nearly as
great as a reduction in direct government spending on goods and services.
It is worth emphasizing
that any state spending reductions or tax
increases are counter-productive at this time: they restrain the economy at a time when it is already
slowing. Given the existence of
balanced budget rules at the state level, some form of federal fiscal
relief to states is therefore warranted.
First, we
should extend the duration and magnitude of the benefits we provide to our
unemployed. The unemployed, in a situation like this, are innocent victims.
Most of the people being thrown out of work want
to work, but our economy is not providing them jobs. Why should they suffer
because of economic mismanagement? This is not only the fairest proposal, but
also the most effective. People who become unemployed cut back on their
expenditures. Giving them more money will directly increase expenditures.
Since our
"safety net" is worse than that of most other industrialized
countries, we also need extensive improvements in health care, food stamps, and
other kinds of programs. For eight years, the most important part of our safety
net has been full employment: people who were let go could get another job
because we had such low unemployment. That is not going to be the case for the
next six months to a year and a half. That part of our safety net has gone, and
we need to put into place an alternative one.
Second, we need
a temporary investment tax credit or expensing, something to stimulate
investment. Making it temporary encourages people to make the investment today,
when the economy needs it and when our resources are not fully utilized. In
1993 we designed an investment tax credit revision that had a huge bang for the
buck. It's called an incremental investment tax credit, and I strongly support
moving in that direction.
Third, we ought
to have better backward averaging of taxes, particularly corporate income
taxes. This is one of the proposals being discussed within the Administration.
One reason why there has not been better backward averaging in the past is tax
avoidance; to avoid this problem, it should be limited to those firms engaged
in investment activities. If these firms were allowed to have a significantly
longer backward averaging, that would help provide them with the funds to
invest more.
Fourth, we need
a more extended program of revenue sharing with state and localities. State and
local expenditures are pro-cyclical: when the economy goes into a downturn,
states and localities typically cut back on their expenditures. This not only
weakens the vital public services that are provided at the state and local
levels, but also deepens the economic downturn.
We could put
money into the states and localities very quickly through a revenue sharing
program that would enable them to avoid the kinds of cutbacks that would affect
every part of society. It would be particularly good to direct funds to areas
of particular need, like Medicaid and education. There are a whole host of
vital needs that are typically provided by state and local programs.
Fifth,
there needs to be an increase in expenditure in high-return areas. It is very
clear that there are areas in the public sector that are starved for funds and
where returns are very high. For instance, the air traffic control system is
woefully inadequate; investments in that area would yield very high returns. We
have inner-city schools that are dilapidated; kids cannot learn in the kind of
environment some of them face. These are areas in which programs are already
underway but in which expenditures can be increased.
--
Excerpted from “Bush's Tax Plan: The Dangers”, New York Review of Books,
Mar. 13, 2003; presentation at Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Press Conference,
October 12, 2001